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D espite being usually considered the fore-bears of diverging schools of thought
that take each other as the very negation of phil-
osophy, Heidegger and Wittgenstein can be said
to deploy similar ideas to disperse the mist that
adumbrates our intellectual lives. The “agree-
ment” between the later Heidegger and the
later Wittgenstein becomes even more apparent
when, as a number of scholars have already
noted (Granel, Études; Mulhall; Braver), one
focuses on the renewal of thinking that their
work is predicated on and calls for. As Braver
writes: “their basic objection is that philosophy
has been practiced in a way that is fundamen-
tally inappropriate for creatures like ourselves”
(9). Similarly, Stanley Cavell articulates the
proximity in terms of the two philosophers’
ability to detect and resist philosophy’s
“chronic tendency to violence” (Philosophy
231) perpetrated against the ordinary world or
what Heidegger would call “the heart of
things.” The question could be put by saying
that whilst philosophy has never stopped being
after the heart of things its way of bringing
this heart closer has deformed and violated it.
Thinking has always directed itself towards
that which exceeds it, to the point of construct-
ing out of this excess the principle of creation
and the world. As heartless as it is, Reason has
not thought for a moment that this principle
was in fact nothing else than its own heart, its
ability to be affected beyond what it could
reduce to an object. Taking things to heart
means, then, at least this: not to reduce the
world to an object but to be carried into a move-
ment that discredits and unsettles reduction.
Discarding this as its opposite, Reason has
insisted in positing a principle of all things, a
One, which it then craved to know but could
not. Philosophy ended up wanting what it was
not ready to accept.
The impulse to resist this violence continues
to inform the possibility for a different articula-
tion of the tectonic rift that splits philosophy
into two, so that at times philosophy will recog-
nize itself as motivated by a single demand. It
is this very call for a renewed resistance of think-
ing to its own inherent violence that animates the
work of Stanley Cavell and Jean-Luc Nancy.
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Retracing paths opened by Heidegger and Witt-
genstein, this renewal is produced through and
with the concept of the world. The world is in
excess of knowledge and this impossible
mastery over the heart of things is for both the
most productive incentive to thinking, under-
stood as a way of taking things to heart.
For both, the gaps opened by an irregular
beating of the heart have provided an impulse,
an occasion for thought. Cavell opens his philo-
sophical diary with these words:
The catheterization of my heart will no longer
be postponed. My cardiologist announces
that he has lost conﬁdence in his understand-
ing of my condition so far based on reports of
what I surmise as symptoms of angina and of
the noninvasive monitoring allowed by X-
Rays and by the angiograms produced in
stress tests. We must actually look at what
is going on inside the heart. (Little Did I
Know 1)
Nancy approaches it this way:
A heart that only half beats is only half my
heart. I was already no longer inside me.
I’m already coming from somewhere else,
or I’m not coming any longer at all. Some-
thing strange is disclosed at the heart of the
most familiar – but “familiar” hardly says
it: at the heart of something that never sig-
naled itself as “heart.” (Corpus 163)
The texts that record this gap, a time of waiting,
suspended, are irrevocably biographical and
philosophical, or better one because of the
other. There the heart of things trembles with
things taken to heart, and philosophy is set to
work by an enforced patience. The sense that
emerges from these two exemplary parallels is
that philosophy is always written as the autobio-
graphy of our relation to the world.
The world thus requires to be liberated for
thinking to get on its way and this liberation
takes place on two sides of the concept. On the
one hand, the world requires to be freed from
the Western tradition that in various forms has
displaced its sense towards an otherworld or
towards a more satisfactory reality. On the
other, the thinking of the world needs to be
afﬁrmed beyond the neutralizing form that an
apparent overcoming of the transcendental tra-
dition has conﬁned it to (ﬁnitude as intellectual
privation, failure of human knowledge, desire
for a more convincing grasp on reality). For
Cavell and Nancy it is a question of thinking
this world here on both sides of the tradition,
interrupting the judicatory authority of divine
principles and resisting the reduction of the
world to an object. The demand that the two
thinkers share is the recuperation of the excess
of reason from the “elsewhere” in which our tra-
dition has projected it. This recuperation
implies not a new reduction but the acknowl-
edgement (a master tone in Cavell) that our
knowledge of the world is not the knowledge of
a fact and that this awareness does not lessen
our involvement with the world, but at the oppo-
site makes it decisively more acute. In The
World Viewed Cavell writes of Terrence
Malick’s ﬁlms: “if in relation to objects capable
of such self-manifestation human beings are
reduced in signiﬁcance [… ] perhaps this is
because in trying to take dominion over the
world [… ] they are refusing their participation
in it” (xvi). These words anticipate the central
question that for Cavell and Nancy thinking
needs to ask: what would it mean to see that
what assures our relation to the world is not
dominion over the totality of objects but the
acceptance of our inexhaustible participation
with them? In his work on Romanticism Cavell
formulates it as follows: “what is our relation
to the case of the world’s existence? Or should
we now see that there is nothing that constitutes
this relation? Or see that there is no one some-
thing?” (In Quest 136). Nancy, on the other
hand, writes that “it is up to us to ‘seize’ the inﬁ-
nite chance and risk of being in the world,
although we know (but is this a knowledge?)
that there is nothing to ‘seize’” (Sense 26). The
starting points from which one can see the
pressure that the world exercises on thinking
are then two: there is no knowledge of the
world that would conclude our knowing the
world; there is nothing we can grasp about the
world, no particular thing that will provide us
with the key to master the rest. Every singular
insurgence of the world is already the exhibition
of all the world there is, and yet this insurgence is
patience of film
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simply a modulation that resonates through all
the surface of the world. Most recently Nancy
has expressed this conﬁguration according to
the logic of “struction,” the passage between
“more than one” and “less than one” without
the mediation of the One (What’s These
Worlds 20). In designating our experience as lib-
erated by Kant from the dominance of rational
thought, Heidegger invokes the idea of a circular
happening, “between us and the thing” (What is
a Thing? 242) and calls this the “Open.” The
world is what “is constantly strange” (243).
According to Cavell and Nancy our task is thus
to install thinking more ﬁrmly within this stran-
geness: the world is strange, irreducibly so, it is a
matter of accepting this, and this acceptance
leads to testimony, creation and responsibility,
rather than grief and resignation. When Cavell
writes that with Wittgenstein it is not a matter
of refuting scepticism but of setting its truth in
motion (our relation to the world is not one of
knowledge, when this implies certainty), he
means precisely to reject the idea that the limit-
ation of reason leaves man in a position of immo-
bility and intellectual despair. Once the truth of
scepticism is acknowledged our possibilities are
unbounded, our embarrassments and inhi-
bitions shaken off. For both Cavell and Nancy
the emergence from these limits introduces a
new chance for thinking.
the world and the viewfinder
The fact that the world no longer has any sense
becomes the acknowledgement that the world is
sense. On the one hand, then, we have nothing
to adhere to, neither Divinity nor Reason,
neither ultimate goal nor organizing principle;
on the other, this situation forces us to enjoy
all the possibilities and demands of sense. The
withdrawal of sense presents both the terminal
expenditure of the idea of destination and the
introduction of a constant agitation, a proliﬁc
turbulence. The world as the essentially inap-
propriable and inextinguishable is the world in
which our possibilities become our responsibil-
ities and vice versa, where every parcel of
sense, every seam in experience contributes to
the sense of the world. To this effect Nancy
writes that “the thought of the sense of the
world is a thought that becomes indiscernible
from its praxis” (Sense 10).
This praxis implies that the world is not a
totality one can envisage or represent, but pre-
cisely that which escapes representation. For
both Cavell and Nancy an insistence on this
impossibility leads to an emphasis on ﬁlm.
Cavell’s The World Viewed is explicitly
written in this direction. How else is one to
read the account of our age as one in which
“our philosophical grasp of the world fails to
reach beyond our taking and holding views of
it” (xxiii)? This passage seems to signal that
the philosophical way out of this deadlock
passes through ﬁlm. To reach beyond world-
views would mean to reach once again towards
the praxis of sense, as that which worldviews
block and exhaust. For Nancy, cinema is a way
of taking care of “that which resists, precisely,
being absorbed in any vision (‘worldviews’, rep-
resentations, imaginations)” (Evidence 18);
cinema takes care of the world. Whilst this
expression carries an inevitable Heideggerian
mark, it should also be heard as an invitation
to a more radical dispossession.1 Inasmuch as
philosophy has understood itself as producer
of worldviews, systems and principle, philos-
ophy has constantly suppressed the thinking
of the world, for any worldview absorbs and dis-
solves the world in its vision.
Two further methodological points can be
made to bear on this: ﬁlm enters philosophy
through a speciﬁc scrutiny of the question of
the world, a scrutiny that attempts to illuminate
the question of the world’s sense without this
referring to anything beyond this world here.
At the same time ﬁlm does not simply illustrate
a moment of this scrutiny. In other words, the
thinking of cinema for both philosophers struc-
tures a way to articulate an original thinking of
the world, rather than simply providing a
sketch, an “image” of its development. For
Nancy and Cavell the thinking of ﬁlm must be
able to resist being absorbed within a more orig-
inal gesture and must be seen as opening up an
opportunity for thinking as such.
What is at stake in ﬁlm is not the order of
simulation and dissimulation, the pervasiveness
rugo
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of simulacra absorbing reality within their reach.
It is rather a question of the exposure of sense, an
exposure that cuts through the simul and its orig-
inal. Both thinkers begin their analyses of ﬁlm by
claiming that ﬁlm exercises a resistance to world-
views: taking views, in Cavell’s words; imposing
visions, in Nancy’s phrasing. In the expression
“worldviews” one hears echoes of Heidegger’s
The Age of the World Picture (Cavell mentions
the inﬂuence this text, once avoided, exercises on
his own). It is the very idea of an “image” or
“picture” of the world that allows us to grasp
the essential nature of our age. Heidegger speci-
ﬁes that the expression has to be understood in
the relation between its two constitutive terms.
“World” indicates here the totality of “what is”
and the meaning attributed to this totality
(nature, history and man). By “picture,” on the
other hand, Heidegger understands not the
reproduction of “what is” but the framing of
the world into a system. Picturing names the
act of framing existents within a plan conceived
in advance. “What is” stands before us systema-
tically and only as such a system does it become a
“world.” Thus “world-picture” means that
“what is” is understood only as that which is sys-
tematically represented in advance, according to
a design conceived prior to any encounter with it.
Heidegger writes: “what is, in its entirety, is now
taken in such a way that it ﬁrst is in being and
only is in being to the extent that it is set up by
man, who represents and sets forth” (Question
Concerning 130–31). Man essentially encounters
“what is” as that which can be represented
according to a fundamental design that is at the
same time the opening of a realm of knowledge.
This projection, Heidegger says, decides essen-
tially and in advance of how “what is” will be
known: “only within the perspective of this
ground plan does an event in nature become
visible as such an event” (120). Whilst for
Greek philosophy man’s role is limited to the
preservation of “the horizon of unconcealment”
(147), with the world-picture man proceeds
“into the unlimited sphere of possible objectiﬁ-
cation, through the reckoning up of the rep-
resentable that is accessible to every man and
binding for all” (ibid.). The expression “world-
view” becomes the name for man’s power to
decide what the world is. Furthermore, accord-
ing to Heidegger, since representation has
decided of the world in advance philosophy is
also abandoned. A world absorbed within a
worldview is in no need of philosophy, because
“it has already taken over a particular interpret-
ation and structuring of whatever is” (140).With
the thinking of man that follows from Descartes
begins the setting aside of all philosophy
(replaced by what Heidegger calls the “laborious
fabrications of such absurd offshoots as the
national-socialist philosophies” (ibid.)). The
Cartesian worldview replaces man as limited by
Being with man as essentially limiting Being
through a gesture of representative mastery.
The new freedom of self-legislating Reason
vanishes in the objectiﬁcation it has ushered
into the world. Because of the priority accorded
in this movement to objectiﬁcation itself, to rep-
resentation, to the original plan one also loses
sight of how, as Cavell puts it, “different differ-
ent things are” (World Viewed 25).
The ﬁrst consequence, then, of ﬁlm’s resist-
ance to worldviews is that ﬁlms operate under
a different regime than that of representations;
the second is that this regime renews a call for
philosophy. Two gestures intertwine in thinking
the world of ﬁlm: to recapture our relation to the
world as one that is not based on knowing as cer-
tainty derived from objectiﬁcation but on the
reception of the singular; to recapture thinking
as that which is attracted and called for by the
insurgence of the singular, by the seam(s) in
experience. Understood in this way, ﬁlm
reopens at once the question of the world and
the question of philosophy. What ﬁlm names
here, then, is the return to the strange, the inter-
esting, the differentiating pressure of the singu-
lar, which cannot and should not be mastered
but exposed, worded, acknowledged (as Cavell
puts it) and adored (as Nancy phrases it).
retouching the world with the
world
Nancy and Cavell decidedly reverse the idea of
cinema as completing the regime of represen-
tation (an idea expressed perhaps most famously
patience of film
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by Bazin), stressing how cinema produces a step
away from thinking as representation, in view of
what I will call thinking as patience.
Nancy frames his discourse on ﬁlm through
the idea that cinema today cannot be understood
as installing anew the problem of represen-
tation. This shift – envisaged in particular in
relation to the work of Abbas Kiarostami and
Claire Denis – is not merely a new development
but signals cinema’s return to its most crucial
question: the release of a look on the world
and the reception of the pressure the world
exercises.
Cinema should be understood here as proble-
matizing the act of looking not in the direction
of a “representing” but in the direction of a
“regarding.” As such, cinema (this cinema,
but then possibly cinema as such) develops not
an “image” of the world but a regard for the
world’s “generating” force (Nancy, Evidence
13). This generating force, of cinema and of
the world with and through it, is possible only
through what Nancy calls evidence: the pressure
of a blind spot that withdraws, becoming
hollow. Evidence is for Nancy the withdrawal
of what makes evident, the subtraction of what
gives birth to an experience of the world.
Every evidence is irreducibly singular, a
pressure at the same time applied and received,
emptying the looking position of any opportu-
nity to “gather” a vision onto itself. The one
who looks is emptied out and is emptied out pre-
cisely in receiving and generating the force that
makes possible a look on the world. That which
makes evident is also that which withdraws from
vision, from imaginations: it opens the world in
opening itself up to it. As Alexander Garcia
Düttmann writes, this “self-evidence exerts
pressure on the gaze urging it to [… ] observe
the world in order to ‘realize the real’” (107).
The preoccupation, then, is not how adequate
cinema is to the real or to a particular vision
of the real but how cinema contributes to what
is proper to this world here: the distension of
its patency, coming from nowhere and going
nowhere. The world’s patency is never a
placing or being in view but rather the afﬁrma-
tion that, to borrow Geŕard Granel’s words on
Kant, “to appear is by no means a ‘moment’
occurring to a reality posited somewhere else
(or ‘in itself’)” (L’Équivoque ontologique 54;
my trans.). The evidential force of the world is
the limiting of an unlimited reality, the
sharing out of singular ﬁnitude. The fact that
cinema directs itself to a safeguarding of the
real means that cinema cuts through the unlim-
ited reality and generates that which it receives:
the circulation of the singular.
One can then understand why Nancy writes:
“such is indeed the deﬁnition of the real: it is
not what is to be signiﬁed, but what runs up
against or violates signiﬁcation” (Gravity 69).
Cinema deals with the world as a force stripped
of signiﬁcations coming from elsewhere. Thus
the realism of cinema for Nancy does not
imply the ﬁrm subsistence of something and
its subsequent mimesis but the opening up of
an otherness within the world (in this sense
horror, fantasy or melodrama is as effective as
the most austere dramas). Cinema addresses
the world as the non-given that must be
sought through the given. This very same move-
ment can be heard in Cavell’s idea that cinema
allows us to “guess the unseen from the seen”
(Themes 14).
conditions of a life
In his account of ﬁlm Cavell sees a unique oppor-
tunity to test the very conditions that structure
our relationship with the world. At the end of
The World Viewed, Cavell voices in concise
fashion the overall purpose of the book: “ﬁlm’s
presenting of the world by absenting us from it
appears as conﬁrmation of something already
true of our existence” (226). Cinema’s ability
to provide access to the world depends on and
is made possible by a loss of intimacy (call it a
loss of given sense) that has unfolded over the
course of the West’s intellectual history. At
the same time cinema does not simply reinforce
this distance but articulates it, making this with-
drawal of given senses and therefore of given
positions its very ﬁgure and strategy.
Cavell’s contention is precisely that this dis-
tance or loss that ﬁlm conﬁrms does not (or
should not) mark or sanction our despair but
inaugurate and rekindle our interest. The
rugo
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truth that Cavell’s philosophy wants for itself –
in inheriting Descartes, Emerson, Thoreau,
Wittgenstein and Heidegger among others – is
the acknowledgement that “the human crea-
ture’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation
to the world, is not that of knowing” (Claim
241). Our work begins precisely from the accep-
tance of this truth and not from a stubborn
refusal of it. If the truth of scepticism is thus
what works through us, and therefore what
truly needs to be worked through, the situation
that cinema makes evident is neither just a
symptom of our malady nor a sign of our recov-
ery. In the world of ﬁlm our relation to the
world is never at rest but taken up every time
anew. This makes of ﬁlm not simply a ﬁgure
of the conditions that have brought it about,
but an active reorganization of these conditions.
In other words, the world of ﬁlm is not a matter
of images and likeness but a gesture that end-
lessly invokes, convokes, provokes and acknowl-
edges the conditions of the world. In a
parenthetical remark from “Knowing and
Acknowledging” Cavell writes that acknowl-
edgement is an existentiale (Must We Mean
263). Since for Heidegger an existentiale forms
part of the ontological (rather than ontical)
structure of Dasein, it becomes clear that
Cavell is here using the parallel to illustrate
how the concept of acknowledgement puts in
play the entire relation of the human creature
with the world. Acknowledgement is the exis-
tential possibility of our relation to the world.
This can take the form of an acceptance of the
world (accepting it cannot be simply known)
or of a refusal of it (refusing it because it
simply cannot be known). In aligning the ambi-
tion to rewrite the human back into the world
with that of Romanticism, Heidegger and Witt-
genstein, Cavell stresses the centrality of
acknowledgement by inviting us “to wrestle
the world from our possessions so that we may
possess it again” (World Viewed 22). This
double use of “possess” calls for a clariﬁcation.
The ﬁrst occurrence (“our possessions”) indi-
cates that we must let go of the world, forgo
the desire for total intelligibility after the
desire for an omniscient God has been dissi-
pated. The second use of the word “possess”
(“may possess”) points towards a renewal and
reversal of the very idea of possession. The
second “possess” does not restore what has
been wrestled away, it radically changes the
sense of possession, in a direction that aims to
solicit a new relation with the world. In this
relation what we have to possess is the power
to be possessed, to make our experience of inter-
est to us, available. The fact that we no longer
possess a world on the one hand points to our
present condition (sense is not given to us; as
Nancy says, “there is no longer a world”), and
on the other it addresses our opportunities to
articulate this absence: we can now possess it,
as long as we become possessed by it. Our
route back into the world does not lead to a
given signiﬁcation, a new ultimate order but to
interest, the possibility to be called and
seduced by strangeness and the ability and auth-
ority to express this interest. To be seduced by a
close-up means to be able to see it as “part of an
object supported by and reverberating the entire
frame of nature” (World Viewed 25). In other
words, the close-up calls for the ability to
install oneself in this reverberation channelled
by the object itself. This perhaps becomes
more convincing once one emphasizes how for
Cavell ﬁlm has not provided the solution to
the problem of the world. This problem is not
one for which it is possible (or advised) to ﬁnd
a solution. Film does not provide in any sense
a possibility of complete intelligibility. It
releases the world once again from our wish
for complete intelligibility – complete because
exhaustive but also because independent of us
– and it is in this sense that ﬁlm realizes the
world, making the sense of the world itself the
impulse and drive of our interest and quest.
To realize the world, bringing its evidence
into view, implies that we rest, as if arrested,
on its force, a force that by its own nature
revokes the model, the possibility of confor-
mity. It is then a matter of drawing this evidence
out whilst remaining submitted to it, addressing
the form received from it as the birth every time
singular, every time new of the world. Taking
care of the world does not mean representing
it, copying or reproducing it but opening up a
stance towards it, a gesture that is at once
patience of film
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ontological, epistemological, aesthetic and
ethical, collapsing the distinction between the
four modes of philosophical enquiry. Taking
care of the real implies the arduous effort to
install oneself in the world’s formative prin-
ciple, which never donates a completed form
one can conform to but a relation, one whose
outline is in every case to be made again, to be
realized. If cinema takes care of the real it is
because it can establish a relation with what
Granel calls the Nemesis of philosophical impa-
tience, “the reticence [pudeur] of the world”
(Apolis 9; my trans.). The world, to use
Granel’s words once again, “does not have a
form, since it is not something given: it is the
formality of the gift, which is something
altogether different” (11; my trans.). This
archi-formality is precisely what cinema turns
itself to, by insisting on the given. If, as
Nancy implies, cinema has exhausted all its pos-
sibilities by working through them, this also
means that it has rejoined its initial demand:
not to exhaust the resources of the image but
to explode our relation with the world they
grant access to. Thus it is the very idea of
image that changes. It does not name a compo-
sition but the agitation of a look, not the thing
captured but the thing’s release; not a complete
proximity with the world but distance, a
measure through which something like access
is possible. In his Notes on Cinematography
Robert Bresson writes that the task of cinema
is “to retouch the real with the real” (24). The
ﬁlmmaker seeks the point of pressure that agi-
tates it so that it can carry us (the audience) in
the same direction. The look thus is this
regard not for the sign it produces but for the
engagement and interest it solicits, for the
patience it demands. Nancy sees a transition
here of cinema from representation to presence.
This presence “is not a matter of vision: it offers
itself to an encounter, a preoccupation or a care”
(Evidence 31). Where Cavell writes that cinema
has brought the problem of reality to a head, by
addressing it automatically, Nancy says that
there are no ﬁxed points in cinema – therefore
no signs to decipher. With ﬁlm, then, nothing
needs to be deciphered, what is on the screen
asks us to become interested.
Since the given is withdrawn (and this is the
original situation cinema installs itself onto;
Cavell calls it our displacement) the given is to
be given again. Nancy writes: “to look means
in the end nothing else than to think the real,
to test oneself against a sense that we can’t
master. The capturing of images in a ﬁlm is a
capture only inasmuch as it is a delivering
[ … ] a realization of the real” (Evidence 39).
In this sense Nancy’s insistent evocation of the
phenomenological lexicon (evidence, gaze,
eyes) serves to mark his departure from this reg-
ister even more explicitly. Opening the eyes is
not a gesture that seizes the phenomenon but
the possibility to deliver oneself to a chiasm,
so that “my eyes and the world are opened
together, the ﬁrst included in the second,
which, at the same time, penetrates them”
(Adoration 47). This look that is commanded
and penetrated is in turn commanding, renew-
ing the command it receives. Film shows us
that we are always passible to the world,
carried to the moment where a pressure exer-
cises itself without remainder. Nancy insists
that the crossing of looking with the evidence
of the world is a consequence of having been
looked at, therefore of addressing that which
always already “shows” itself. The intimacy
achieved here does not exercise itself as the
proximity of a grasping of the given but as the
pressure that, whilst imposing a distance, pro-
duces a stance, an ethos. Evidence and look
translate not into certainty, ﬁrmness, assurance
but as regards and conducts, ways of being in
the world. Cinema takes care of the real and rea-
lizes it, precisely because this real is not what is
always already there but what in what is there
awaits acknowledgement and expression. If the
world is without sense, then this (and only
this) is what cinema can address: the fact that
“everything refers back to everything and thus
everything shows itself through everything”
(What’s These Worlds 54), without this referral
elevating itself beyond this world here and the
fortuity and contingency of its sense. The
address and response are never ﬁnal, the world
is the very impulse of an unﬁnishable. Film’s
work begins just before and immediately after
the given. It addresses the “just before”
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because no capturing “captures” the world, no
composition can complete and enclose its
sense. It addresses the “immediately after”
because capturing is not the right pose, the
world demands rather to be made to
circulate once again, looked at and shaken,
addressed and responded to. The world is not
a given but the reticence that comes with the
given.
Nancy says it explicitly: cinema structures
the world of today because in its looking at a
passage without direction it re-cognizes – that
is, it acknowledges – the order of this world
that catches itself in its own passage, withdraw-
ing from “every kind of visionary seeing, fore-
seeing and clairvoyant gazing” (Evidence 20).
It takes care of the real in this sense, “each
time it is about a reconﬁguration of experience
and therefore of the world” (ibid.). A reconﬁ-
guration of the whole world implies the
acknowledgement of the inherent singularity
of our many encounters with it. Before any
choice, gesture, camera movement or frame,
cinema must bring itself to the point where it
has to acknowledge a resistance from the
world and in this resistance a sort of partici-
pation with it. Serge Daney captures this inter-
ested resistance with usual eloquence:
because it is impossible to predict every-
thing, what one needs to do is accommodate
the “more” that comes from the real [… ]
The ﬁlmmaker looks once and then he too
becomes passive and disappears between
what he has rendered and what he didn’t
want. (L’Exercice 60)
a scene of instruction
Cinema can teach us, as Cavell writes, “how
different different things are” (World Viewed
19). This instruction, however, does not orig-
inate from a mimetic power, it is rather a
matter of what Nancy, playing with the etymol-
ogy of education, calls a “bringing out,” a
gesture according to which the look learns to
attend to the world and therefore is led
towards that which escapes it. What in the
world instructs the look is also what imposes
on it a certain immobility, what pushes it not
to penetration but to arrest at the just distance.
This distance produces a stance, a way of regard-
ing things.
Cavell insists on a similar point in order to
reach this very measure, the acknowledgement
of distance. Cinema is of the world and its
frames produce a resonance onto the world
that is therein implicitly included (because
explicitly excluded). This satisﬁes for Cavell
our wish, which modern philosophy had
placed as our limit, to see “the world itself”
and therefore to fulﬁl “the condition of
viewing as such” (World Viewed 102). Film’s
e-ducation lies in its disclosure of this condition:
ﬁlm forces us to face our yearning to frame the
world without our framing of it being revealed
as ours.
The world of ﬁlm is of the world and as such
our relation to it shows that our relation to the
world as such is self-defeating. In a passage on
Baudelaire, Cavell writes that “ﬁlm returns to
us and extends our ﬁrst fascination with
objects, with their inner and ﬁxed lives”
(World Viewed 43). From this Cavell con-
cludes, then, that from ﬁlm we learn the world
itself, “which in practice now means learning
to stop altering it illegitimately, against itself”
(102). Film thus invokes our situation in the
world in two ways: on the one hand it tells us
that a certain powerlessness is natural to us
and on the other it invites us to think that it is
not natural to assume that we are always natu-
rally powerless. In other words, our displace-
ment from the events on screen tells the story
of our responsibility towards the world. This
story has two sides: our displacement is
natural inasmuch as our attempts to possess
the world are constantly and inevitably
rebuked (the world is not to be possessed, not
something we can possess by perfecting our
knowledge), unnatural if following the failure
of these attempts we feel free to decline respon-
sibility for what we say and do. Cavell insists
that our inability to know is dictated always by
our unwillingness to know, in particular when
this takes the form of wanting to know too
much: the problem arises not from wanting
too much from our knowledge but from
wanting knowledge too much. We wish to
patience of film
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overcome our displacement from the world, but
we do so in the wrong way and therefore we keep
reinforcing the displacement.
On the one hand ﬁlm enlarges our fantasy of
possession and on the other it shows us that pos-
session of the world is precisely our own fantasy
and that from within this fantasy we can give
possession over (and be possessed), wrestle the
world away from us so that we can possess it
again. Similarly in his analysis of Wordsworth’s
poetry Cavell regards participation in the splen-
dour of the everyday as achievable only after we
have foregone the grief that follows our inevita-
ble departure from childhood. As the ﬁnal scene
of Rosemary’s Baby (1968) reveals, only
Rosemary herself is in a position to give the
child over to the Devil, for it is only “from
within a fantasy of possession that the child
could (logically) have been given” (World
Viewed 89). In the very different Five Easy
Pieces (1970) Bobby Dupea (played with
subdued solemnity by Jack Nicholson) dis-
covers that it is entirely up to him to let a new
possession take hold (in the form of a father,
his brother’s girlfriend or Chopin’s Prelude in
E Minor) and, perhaps unsurprisingly, decides
against it. In other words, he accepts to
remain somewhere between his successful dis-
possession of the world and the incapacity to
express anything different (be possessed). The
truck driver who picks him up at the petrol
station after he has left his girlfriend behind
suggests that this somewhere, this place
between, “is colder than hell” (and Dupea is
not adequately attired). Another place exists
where we can express the world after having
learned how not to “alter it illegitimately,
against itself.” In this place we are interested
and cinema reaches for it “naturally.” As
Cavell writes, the camera left to itself
“awakens the self” to the unnatural naturalness
of its lack of interest. Left to itself, the camera
brings us outside and educates, claiming “our
attention wholly for that thing now” and
showing that it is not “novelty that has worn
off, but our interest in our own experience”
(World Viewed 122). If this is the case, if the
camera can produce this turning when left to
itself, it can also make evident how the world
left to itself, not manipulated “illegitimately,
against itself,” can elicit this interest.
Cavell’s interpretation of Frank Capra’s It
Happened One Night (1934) offers another
instance of this. It is worth mentioning that
Cavell’s essay frames the ﬁlm as an exploration
of knowledge and the limits Kant set for it. The
ﬁlm shows for Cavell that substituting knowl-
edge for acknowledgement produces a speciﬁc
kind of violence on the world (and therefore
on others). Renouncing this violence implies
forgoing the ambition for a position outside
the world, from which to view and arrange our
fate. In these matters there is only one option,
to make things happen, but “to make things
happen, you must let them happen” (Pursuits
109).
Without this acceptance of loss there is no
knowledge whose grasping would be worth the
price of waiting. What puts the camera in a pos-
ition to educate is its power to disperse not the
loss but the terror of loss, our inability to lose
the sense of loss, the paralysing dread at the for-
feiture of propriety implied by our emergence
from innocence. To allow propriety to vanish
means to put oneself in the position to attend
to the world, “the reception of actuality – the
pain and balm in the truth of the only world:
that it exists and I in it” (World Viewed 117).
For something to be so received one has to be
able to let things be, “to act without performing,
to allow action all and only the signiﬁcance of its
speciﬁc traces” (153).
The equivalent philosophical practice that
can produce this turn to and return of the
world would move from the idea that “what is
of philosophical importance, or interest – what
there is for philosophy to say – is happening
repeatedly, unmelodramatically, uneventfully”
(This New Yet Unapproachable America 75).
It is a practice that for Cavell is based on the
most unpromising ground, “a ground of
poverty, of the ordinary, the attainment of the
everyday” (77). Nancy uses the same term
poverty to designate the ethos of our (need
for) abandonment by and to the world as a
way to reopen its sense beyond what we know
of it, call it a movement from knowledge to
interest. If philosophy is still awaiting (itself),
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if for it the moment of this practice is still to
come, cinema can be said to anticipate a
gesture philosophy wants for itself.
This gesture registers a different passion of
thinking, or better a power of patience, necess-
ary to thinking: in order to have the world one
needs to let it be, and the fascination therein
produced is always to be accompanied by parti-
ality, outsideness, contingency. It is a limited
access, but it is this very limitation that ulti-
mately awards it its singularity. A power of
patience, at once an attentive reception and an
intense leap, is needed in order to open one’s
access to the world, to open it in the only way
it can be opened, as something going beyond
myself, extending the reach of my words and
actions, pushing them beyond my reasonable
control, beyond my epistemological doubts.
The world is received on this condition or else
it is missed. Unless we can open and maintain
a connection with the world from the fragments
of it that we are given, accepting its survival
beyond the reach of our actions and accepting
that responsibility for it extends beyond the
privacy we wish upon ourselves, the world will
drop out, an inert object.
Then cinema becomes a condition more than
a technique of representation: patience directed
towards the refractory singularity of the world,
its sense both received and expressed, neither
turned into a project nor into a purpose. Film
realizes the fact that the sense of the world is
evident, turned towards us, whether or not we
want it. This evidence that we confront
without mastering calls us to vigilance and
attention, to regard and respect. Like any evi-
dence it is not something secret but completely
revealed. Nancy writes: “one cannot not see it
[… ] even if not everyone looks out for it or
pays attention to it” (Adoration 46). We call evi-
dence that which exhausts itself in its presen-
tation; it is not referable to any outside and
yet produces a commotion of sense. We can all
see it, we cannot avoid it, it ﬂashes in front of
us and yet it arrests us only if we pay attention
to it. Only in this moment of attention, in this
arrest, do we start articulating, picking up the
shaking it produces. Evidence does not bring
something forward, does not let a particular
object or person stand in front of us more
clearly, it reduces the object to nothing, to
something that can neither be grasped nor
assimilated.
Nancy calls the gesture that receives and
addresses, this evidence that welcomes and
salutes, adoration. This salutation affords us
access to the sense of the world as a relation
not to a something but to that which solicits
our responsibility to respond. Our access to
the world, then, appears where “forces precede
and follow us, where forces are not concerned
with a subject’s calculation and projection, but
where one might rather say that a subject, by
welcoming these forces, by espousing their
impetus, might have some chance of shaping
itself” (Adoration 47). Our longing for the
unconditioned can turn from the desire to be
freed of every conditioning into the patience to
bear the condition of the world, its presentation
of the nothing it comes from and goes to.
It might be, then, that a certain reluctance to
accepting ﬁlm (the passivity it is said to impose)
as having an intrinsic force of philosophical
instruction resonates with a speciﬁc aversion
internal to the work of philosophy. There is in
philosophical practice an inclination to view
thinking as grasping, making and clutching.
The intolerance for ﬁlm manifests philosophy’s
intolerance for reception and seduction, as if
philosophical thinking could not be interested,
could not account for its beginning otherwise
than as a movement of self-generation. For
Cavell and Nancy an embracing of ﬁlm would
also show to philosophy its own repressions,
illuminate within philosophy the denial of
reception, a tendency to violence and resentful-
ness. So to take attentiveness and patience as the
very founding of philosophy means somehow to
open reason to what seems at ﬁrst its very rever-
sal. Film’s ability to tell us “how different
different things are” is an invitation to patience,
at once reception of the singular and salute of
the incommensurable value of the world. From
then on, after ﬁlm, philosophy does not speak
ﬁrst and its virtue (thus its force, for that is
where the word comes from) becomes patience.
For Emerson the conversion to thinking
demands that we understand thinking as
patience of film
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accepting, receiving existence, so that our con-
version is not the preparation for great deeds
but the unfolding of a patient abandonment. It
is this abandonment to our romance with the
world, abandonment to the response it claims
from us, its always initial contestation of our
attention, that gets us on the way to thinking.
For both Wittgenstein and Heidegger,
getting on this way means letting things be,
leaving everything as it is, being vigilant to the
heart of things. In Emerson’s Experience one
reads “Patience and patience, we shall win at
last” (310). Cavell responds that this “is the
work of realizing your world” (Emerson’s
Transcendental Etudes 136). This realization
is, like the one of ﬁlm, the possibility to
endure and bear the excess of the world’s
pressure. Cavell concludes the passage by
writing that “the recovery from loss is [… ] a
ﬁnding of the world, a returning of it, to it.
The price is necessarily to give something up,
to let go of something” (138). Thinking has no
remedy for this loss of grasp;
our curse is wanting one where
none is needed. Patience and
patience, we shall lose (and this
loss will be a thought for the
world).
disclosure statement
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note
1 It is worth stressing how in this term one should
also hear the “art of ‘deremption’ (dessaisie)” (my
trans.) invoked by Granel in his remarks on Rainer
Schurmann’s Broken Hegemonies (Apolis 123).
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